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Abstract
Key exposure is a major threat to secure cryptosystems. To mitigate the impact caused by
key-compromise attacks, a key-insulated cryptographic mechanism is a better alternative.
For securing the large message communication in peer-to-peer networks, in this paper, we
propose the first novel identity-based key-insulated encryption (IB-KIE) scheme with
message linkages. Our scheme has the properties of unbounded time periods and
random-access key-updates. In the proposed scheme, each client can periodically update his
private key while the corresponding public one remains unchanged. The essential security
assumption of our proposed scheme is based on the well-known bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem (BDHP). To ensure the practical feasibility, we also formally prove that the
proposed scheme achieves the security requirement of confidentiality against
indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in the random
oracle model.
Keywords: identity-based, key-insulated, encryption, message linkages, bilinear pairing.
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1. Introduction

The first public key cryptosystem was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [1] in 1976. In
such a system, each user has a self-chosen private key and a corresponding public one. Two
important techniques, the public key encryption and the digital signature scheme [2-4], are
commonly adopted for ensuring the properties of integrity, confidentiality [5], authenticity [6]
and non-repudiation [7]. In 1984, Shamir [8] proposed an identity-based system in which
each user’s public key is explicitly his own identity information (such as the name and
e-mail address, etc.) while the corresponding private key is computed by a private key
generation center (PKG). The derived private key is then sent to each user via a secure
channel. Compared with the traditional public key system, an identity-based system is
unnecessary to maintain public key certificates. Yet, in practice the key exposure is a major
threat to system security and it sometimes imposes extra burdens to reset the whole system
again.
To deal with the issue of key exposure, in 2002, Dodis et al. [9] proposed a key-insulated
cryptosystem in which each user has a long-term private key and a short-term one,
respectively. The former is stored in a physically-secure but computation limited device
(called base or helper) while the latter is kept secret by the user. The general idea of
key-insulated systems is that at different time periods each user can periodically update his
short-term private key with the assistance of helper while the corresponding public key
remains unchanged. The next year, they [10] further presented the notion of strongly
key-insulated systems, i.e., even if the helper is corrupted by a malicious adversary, he
cannot perform any operation with respect to the user’s private key.
Considering identity-based systems, in 2005, Hanaoka et al. [11] proposed the first
identity-based key-insulated system from bilinear maps. They also showed how to construct
a partially collusion resistant hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBEI) from arbitrary
IBE in the random oracle model. In 2006, Zhou et al. [12] proposed an identity-based
key-insulated signature scheme based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
The formal security proof is also realized in the random oracle model. Later, Hanaoka et al.
[13] proposed a parallel key-insulated public key encryption scheme in which two
independent helpers are involved for updating user’s private keys alternatively. Such a
mechanism helps with reducing the possibility of helper exposure and increasing the security
of helpers. In 2008, Weng et al. [14] addressed an identity-based (k, n) threshold
key-insulated encryption scheme in which at least k out of n helpers are sufficient to update
the user’s short-term private key. Besides, the security of their scheme is proved in the
standard model. For facilitating the delegation operation in an organization, in 2009, Wan et
al. [15] proposed a strongly identity-based key-insulated proxy signature scheme with secure
key-updates. Their scheme also supports unbounded time periods and random-access
key-updates. Recently, Yu et al. [16] proposed a new identity-based key-insulated signature
scheme and applied it to a novel application called full delegation proxy signature scheme
with time restriction. Their scheme has the advantages of efficient key-update procedures
and low computational costs for the verifier.
In a peer-to-peer network, each computer is served as both a server and a client. With an
ad-hoc manner, communications can be directly established by two end computers. Consider
the real situation that the communication message in a peer-to-peer file transmission system
might be large. It therefore causes the difficulty in encrypting such a large plaintext due to
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the limited system bandwidth. Furthermore, in an identity-based system, the key exposure
attack is considered the most serious one, as the corresponding user identity has to be
removed from the system. Although previous mentioned works [11-16] have addressed some
solutions using key-insulted systems, their schemes are not suitable for large file
transmission in peer-to-peer networks. It thus can be seen that extending the capability of
current IB-KIE scheme for facilitating the peer-to-peer file transmission system is vital. In
this paper, we propose the first identity-based key-insulated encryption (IB-KIE) scheme
with message linkages. In our scheme, we first divide a large plaintext into lots of smaller
message blocks and then encrypt them, respectively. Each ciphertext of message blocks is
chained with its preceding one using a collision-resistant one-way hash function and the
exclusive-OR operation. The bilinear computation is only employed to derive the mutual
shared private key, rather than chaining all ciphertext blocks. Consequently, the number of
required pairing operations remains a constant when the message blocks increase. The
division of large files not only benefits the encryption process with limited system bandwidth,
but also reduces the retransmission overheads in case of some erroneous blocks. In a
peer-to-peer file transmission system, the division of large files enables a client to
simultaneously download blocks from one peer and upload previously received blocks to
another, as so to save the overall transmission time. The gains obtained through our proposed
scheme include lower computational efforts (compared with previous works) and the
capability of large file transmission. With our proposed scheme, the impact of key exposure
can be minimized and two end computers can encrypt and transfer a large plaintext without
increasing extra computational costs, i.e., only one mutual shared private key will be
generated for transmitting multiple blocks in one communication session. Additionally, the
formal security proof of confidentiality against indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is presented in the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states some preliminaries. We
introduce the proposed IB-KIE scheme with message linkages in Section 3. The security
proof is detailed in Section 4. Finally, a conclusion is made in Section 5.

2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some security notions and the computational assumptions.
The proposed scheme is based on the bilinear pairing from elliptic curve systems. A
commonly adopted security assumption comes from the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(BDHP). We state the basic operations of bilinear pairing and the BDH assumption below:
Bilinear Pairing
Let (G1, +) and (G2, ) denote two groups of the same prime order q and e: G1 × G1 → G2
be a bilinear map which satisfies the following properties:
(i) Bilinearity:
e(P1 + P2, Q) = e(P1, Q)e(P2, Q);
e(P, Q1 + Q2) = e(P, Q1)e(P, Q2);
(ii) Non-degeneracy:
If P is a generator of G1, e(P, P) is a generator of G2.
(iii) Computability:
Given P, Q G1, the value of e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed by a polynomial-time
algorithm.
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Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem; BDHP
4
The BDHP is, given an instance (P, A, B, C)  G1 where P is a generator, A = aP, B = bP
abc
and C = cP for some a, b, c  Zq, to compute e(P, P)  G2.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial Q() and
all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the BDHP with an advantage at most 1/Q(k),
i.e.,
abc
4
Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP) = e(P, P) ; a, b, c  Zq, (P, aP, bP, cP)  G1 ]  1/Q(k).
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance and over the
random choices of A.
Definition 1. The (t, )-BDH assumption holds if there is no polynomial-time adversary that
can solve the BDHP in time at most t and with the advantage .

3. Proposed IB-KIE Scheme with Message Linkages
In this section, we first address involved parties and algorithms of our proposed scheme and
then give concrete constructions. Some performance analyses with previous works are also
demonstrated.
3.1 Involved Parties
An IB-KIE scheme has four involved parties: a private key generation center (PKG), a helper
(device) and two communication clients. Each one is a Probabilistic Polynomial-time Turing
Machine (PPTM). The PKG is responsible for generating each user’s initial private key and a
master helper key. Each client can periodically update his i-th private key at time period i
with the assistance of his helper.
3.2 Algorithms
The proposed IB-KIE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
k
– Setup: Taking as input 1 where k is a security parameter, the PKG generates system’s
public parameters params and a master helper key.
–KeyExtract (KE): The KE algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, an
identity ID, the master secret key of PKG. It generates an initial private key SID, 0 with
respect to the identity ID.
–KeyUpdate (KU): The KU algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a time
period i, a helper key HKID, i and a private key SID, i1. It generates a private key SID, i for
the time period i.
– Encryption (Enc): The Enc algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a time
period i, a plaintext and the identity of receiver. It generates a corresponding ciphertext .
– Decryption (Dec): The Dec algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a
ciphertext  and the private key of receiver. It outputs the recovered plaintext or an error
symbol ⊥.
3.3 Basic Construction of IB-KIE Scheme
Motivated by Wan et al.’s [15] and Yu et al.’s [16] schemes, in this subsection, we first give a
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basic construction of our IB-KIE scheme without message linkages. Details of each
algorithm are described below:
k

– Setup: Taking as input 1 , the private key generation center (PKG) chooses a master secret
key s R Zq along with a master helper key w R Zq, and then computes the corresponding
public keys PTA = sP and PHK = wP , respectively. The master helper key w is sent to the
helper via a secure channel. The PKG also selects two groups (G1, +) and (G2, ) of the
same prime order q where |q| = k. Let P be a generator of order q over G1, e: G1  G1  G2
k
a bilinear pairing, H: {0, 1}  G1 and F: G1  G2  Zq collision resistant hash functions.
The PKG announces public parameters params = {PTA, PHK, G1, G2, q, P, e, H, F}.
– KeyExtract (KE): Given an identity, say IDA of the client Alice, the PKG computes the
initial private key as
SA, 0 = sH(IDA) + wH(IDA, 0),
(1)
and then returns it to Alice via a secure channel.
– KeyUpdate (KU): Given an identity IDA and a time period i  {1, …, N}, the helper first
generates a helper key as
HKA, i = w[H(IDA, i)  H(IDA, i  1)]
(2)
and then sends it to Alice who can therefore update her private key by computing
SA, i = SA, i1 + HKA, i.
(3)
The values (SA, i1, HKA, i) are deleted subsequently.
– Encryption (Enc): At time period i  {1, …, N}, to encrypt a plaintext M for Alice, a
sender first chooses t R Zq and then computes
T = tP,
(4)
 = e(PTA, tH(IDA))e(PHK, tH(IDA, i)),
(5)
C = M  F(T, ).
(6)
The ciphertext is  = (i, T, C) which is then delivered to Alice.
– Decryption (Dec): Upon receiving the ciphertext  = (i, T, C), Alice decrypts it with her
private key SA, i at time period i  {1, …, N} by computing
1
M = C  F(T, e(T, SA, i)) .
(7)
If the recovered redundancy in M is valid, Alice accepts the plaintext. Otherwise, an error
symbol ⊥ is returned to signal that  is invalid. We show that Eq. (7) works correctly.
From the right-hand side of Eq. (7), we have
1
C  F(T, e(T, SA, i))
1
= C  F(T, e(T, sH(IDA) + wH(IDA, i)))
(by Eq. (1))
1
= C  F(T, e(T, sH(IDA))e(T, wH(IDA, i))
1
= C  F(T, e(sT, H(IDA))e(wT, H(IDA, i))
1
= C  F(T, e(stP, H(IDA))e(wtP, H(IDA, i))
(by Eq. (4))
1
= C  F(T, e(PTA, tH(IDA))e(PHK, tH(IDA, i)))
1
= C  F(T, )
(by Eq. (5))
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= M  F(T, )  H(T, )
=M
which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (7).
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(by Eq. (6))

3.4 Construction of IB-KIE Scheme with Message Linkages
Based on our basic IB-KIE scheme, we introduce an IB-KIE scheme with message linkages
to benefit the encryption of a large plaintext by dividing it into lots of small blocks. Let F1:
Zq  Zq be a collision resistant hash function. The construction is similar as our basic
IB-KIE scheme stated in Section 3.3. We only describe the different parts as follows:
– Encryption (Enc): At time period i  {1, …, N}, to encrypt a large plaintext M for Alice,
a sender first divides M into l pieces, i.e., M = M1 || M2 || … || Ml, Mr’s  Zq, and then
chooses t R Zq and C0 = 0 to compute (T, ) as Eqs. (4) and (5). The sender further
computes
Cr = Mr  F1(Cr  1  F(T, )), for r = 1, 2,…, l.
(6*)
The ciphertext is  = (i, T, C1, C2, …, Cl) which is then delivered to Alice.
– Decryption (Dec): Upon receiving  = (i, T, C1, C2, …, Cl), Alice first decrypts it with her
private key SA, i at time period i  {1, …, N} by computing
1
Mr = Cr  F1(Cr  1  F(T, e(T, SA, i))) , for r = 1, 2,…, l,
(7*)
and then recovers the original plaintext M as M1 || M2 || … || Ml. If the recovered
redundancy in M is valid, Alice accepts the plaintext. Otherwise, an error symbol ⊥ is
returned to signal that  is invalid.
We show that Alice can recover M with her private key by Eq. (7*). From the
right-hand side of Eq. (7*), we have
1
Cr  F1(Cr  1  F(T, e(T, SA, i)))
1
= Mr  F1(Cr  1  F(T, ))  F1(Cr  1  F(T, e(T, SA, i)))
(by Eq. (6*))
= Mr
which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (7*).
3.5 Performance Analyses
In a pairing-based IB-KIE scheme, it will incur more computational efforts to extend such an
algorithm to the scheme with message linkages when the encrypted message is tightly
combined with the pairing computation. For example, the pairing computation of Hanaoka et
al.’s scheme [11] takes as input the encrypted message. When we extend their algorithm to
the scheme with message linkages by our construction, a sender has to employ the pairing
operation for chaining all ciphertext blocks. That is to say, the number of bilinear pairing will
be proportional to that of message blocks. Yet, in our proposed scheme, the bilinear
computation is only adopted to derive the mutual shared private key. Table 1 demonstrates
the efficiency comparisons among the proposed and previous works including Hanaoka et
al.’s [11] (HHS for short) and Weng et al.’s [14] (WLC for short) schemes in terms of the
number of required pairing computation which is considered the most time-consuming
operation. It can be seen that both HHS and WLC schemes incur more computational efforts
as the message blocks increase while ours remains a constant, i.e., 3.
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Table 1. Comparisons of required pairing computation
Scheme
HHS

WLC

Ours

#Message block
1

4

4

3

n

4n

4n

3

4. Security Proof
In this section, we define the crucial security requirement of our proposed IB-KIE scheme
and prove it in the random oracle model. Since our IB-KIE scheme with message linkages
has almost the same structures as those in the basic scheme, it is sufficient to show the
security of our basic scheme. The security of the proposed IB-KIE scheme with message
linkages is directly implied by it.
4.1 Security Requirement
The crucial security requirement of proposed IB-KIE scheme is confidentiality against
indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). We define the
notion as follows:
Definition 2. An IB-KIE scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of confidentiality
against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if there is
no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with non-negligible advantage in the following
game played with a challenger B:
k
Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 ) algorithm and sends the system’s public parameters params
to the adversary A.
Phase 1: The adversary A can issue several queries adaptively, i.e., each query might be
based on the result of previous queries:
– KeyExtract (KE) queries: A makes a KE query for some identity ID. B returns the initial
private key SID, 0.
– Helper-Keye (HK) queries: A makes an HK query for some identity ID and the time period
i  {1, …, N}. B returns the corresponding helper key HKID, i.
– KeyUpdate (KU) queries: A makes a KU query for some identity ID and the time period
i  {1, …, N}. B returns the corresponding private key SID, i.
– Encryption (Enc) queries: A makes an Enc query for a plaintext M, a time period
i  {1, …, N} and an identity ID. B returns the corresponding ciphertext  to A.
– Decryption (Dec) queries: A makes a Dec query for a ciphertext  with respect to an
identity ID. If the decrypted plaintext has correct redundancy, B returns it. Otherwise, an
error symbol ⊥ is returned as a result.
Challenge: The adversary A produces two messages, M0 and M1, of the same length and
chooses a fresh identity ID* along with a time period i*  {1, …, N}. The challenger B
flips a coin  ← {0, 1} and generates a ciphertext * in relation to (i*, M, ID*). The
ciphertext * is then delivered to A as a target challenge.
Phase 2: The adversary A can issue new queries as those in Phase 1 except the KE(ID*),
HK(i*, ID*), KU(i*, ID*) and Dec(*, ID*) queries.
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Guess: At the end of the game, A outputs a bit . The adversary A wins this game if  = .
We define A’s advantage as Adv(A) = | Pr[ = ] − 1/2 |.
4.2 Security Proof
We prove that the proposed scheme achieves the IND-CCA2 security in the random oracle
model as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The proposed IB-KIE scheme is (t, qH, qF, qKE, qHK, qKU, qEnc, qDec, )-secure
against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in the
random oracle model if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that can
(t', ')-break the BDHP, where
N  1 qDec
1
'  (qF  )(2 
),

qKU
2k
t'  t + t(2qEnc + qDec).
Here N is the number of total time periods and t is the time for performing one bilinear
pairing operation.

(P, xP, yP, zP)
input

B

{PTA, PHK, G1, G2, q, P, e}
input

A

Random oracle

access

KE, HK, KU,
Enc, Dec query

output


output
xyz

e(P, P)

Fig. 1. The proof structure of Theorem 1
Proof: Fig. 1 depicts the proof structure of this theorem. Suppose that a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A can (t, qH, qF, qKE, qHK, qKU, qEnc, qDec, )-break the
proposed IB-KIE scheme with non-negligible advantage  under adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks after running at most t steps and making at most qH H, qF F, qKE KE, qHK HK, qKU
KU, qEnc Enc and qDec Dec queries. Then we can construct another algorithm B that
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(t', ')-breaks the BDHP by taking A as a subroutine. The objective of B is to obtain
xyz
e(P, P) by taking (P, xP, yP, zP) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a challenger to A in
the following game.
k
Setup: The challenger B runs the Setup(1 ) algorithm to obtain the system’s public
parameters params = {G1, G2, q, P, e}. Then B sets PTA = xP and PHK = dP where d R Zq.
After that, B returns (params, PTA, PHK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1: A makes the following queries adaptively:
– H oracle: When A queries an H oracle of H(IDj), B first checks H_list for a matched entry.
Otherwise, B chooses hj R Zq, adds the entry (IDj, hj, hj P) to H_list, and returns hj P as a
result.
– F oracle: When A queries an F oracle of F(Tj, j), B first checks F_list for a matched entry.
Otherwise, B chooses fj R Zq and adds the entry (Tj, j, fj) to F_list. Finally, B returns fj as
a result.
–KE queries: When A makes a KE query for IDj, B returns the initial private key Sj, 0 = hj(xP)
+ d(hj, 0 P) to A.
– HK queries: When A makes an HK query for (i, IDj) where i  {1, …, N} is the time
period, B returns the helper key HKj, i = d[H(IDj, i)  H(IDj, i  1)] to A.
– KU queries: When A makes a KU query for (i, IDj) where i  {1, …, N} is the time period,
B returns the corresponding private key Sj, i = hj(xP) + d(hj, i P) to A.
– Enc queries: When A makes an Enc query with respect to (i, M, ID) where i  {1, …, N} is
the time period, B follows the steps in Section 3.3 to return the ciphertext  = (i, T, C).
– Dec queries: When A makes a Dec query for some pair (IDj, ) where  = (i, T, C), B first
derives the private key Sj, i = hj(xP) + d(hj, i P) to run the Decryption algorithm in Section
3.3 and then returns the corresponding result.
Challenge: The adversary A produces two messages, M0 and M1, of the same length and
chooses a fresh identity ID* along with a time period i*  {1, …, N}. The challenger B
flips a coin  ← {0, 1} and generates a ciphertext * in relation to (i*, M, ID*) as follows:
Step 1
Add the entry (ID*, null, yP) to H_list,
i.e., implicitly define H(ID*) = yP where y is unknown to B.
Step 2
Set T* = zP;
Step 3
Choose f* R Zq and add the entry (T*, null, f*) to F_list,
i.e., implicitly define F(T*, *) = f* where * is unknown to B.
Step 4
Compute C* = M  f*.
The ciphertext * = (i*, T*, C*) is then delivered to A as a target challenge.
Phase 2: A makes new queries as those stated in Phase 1 except the KE(ID*), HK(i*, ID*),
KU(i*, ID*) and Dec(*, ID*) queries. When A makes a KU query for (i, ID*) where
i  {1, …, i*  1, i* + 1, …, N}, B directly terminates. When A makes a Dec query for
some pair (ID*, ) where  = (i, T, C), B searches F_list for a matched entry (Tj, j, fj)
1
where Tj = T and then returns M = C  fj to A. Otherwise, an error symbol ⊥ is returned
as a result.
Analysis of the game: We first evaluate the simulation of Dec queries. One can observe that
it is possible for a Dec query of some valid pair (ID*, ) where  = (i, T, C) to return the

KSII TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS VOL. 7, NO. 11, Nov. 2013
Copyright ⓒ 2013 KSII

2937

error symbol ⊥ on condition that A doesn’t query the corresponding F(T, ) random oracle.
k
However, such the probability for any Dec query is not greater than 2 . Since A is allowed
to make at most qDec Dec queries, the above situation happens during the entire simulation
k
k
game, denoted by Dec_ERR, would be less than (qDec)2 , i.e., Pr[Dec_ERR]  (qDec)2 .
Also note that B terminates for some KU queries with respect to (i, ID*) where i  {1, …,
i*  1, i* + 1, …, N}. We express such an event during the entire simulation game as
1
KU_ERR and Pr[KU_ERR]  (N  1)(qKU) . Additionally, in the challenge phase, B has
returned a simulated ciphertext * = (i*, T*, C*) where H(ID*) = yP and T* = zP, which
implies the parameter * is implicitly defined as
* = e(PTA, zH(ID*))e(PHK, zH(ID*, i))
= e(xP, z(yP))e(dP, z(h*, i* P))
xyz
= e(P, P) e(dP, (h*, i*)(zP)).
Let NA be the event that the entire simulation game does not abort. Obviously, if the
adversary A never asks an F(T*, *) oracle query in Phase 2, the entire simulation game
could be normally terminated. We denote the event that A does ask such an oracle query in
Phase 2 by QF*. When the entire simulation game does not abort, it can be seen A gains no
advantage in guessing  due to the randomness of random oracles, i.e.,
Pr[ =  | NA] = 1/2.
(8)
Rewriting the expression of Pr[ = ], we have
Pr[ = ] = Pr[ =  | NA] Pr[NA] + Pr[ =  | NA] Pr[NA]
 (1/2)Pr[NA] + Pr[NA]
(by Eq. (8))
= (1/2)(1  Pr[NA]) + Pr[NA]
= (1/2) + (1/2)Pr[NA].
(9)
On the other hand, we can also derive that
Pr[ = ]  Pr[ =  | NA] Pr[NA]
= (1/2)(1  Pr[NA])
= (1/2)  (1/2)Pr[NA].
(10)
With inequalities (9) and (10), we know that
| Pr[ = ] − 1/2 |  (1/2)Pr[NA].
(11)
Recall that in Definition 2, A’s advantage is defined as Adv(A) = | Pr[ = ] − 1/2 |. By
assumption, A has non-negligible probability  to break the proposed scheme. We therefore
have
 = | Pr[ = ] − 1/2 |
 (1/2)Pr[NA]
(by Eq. (11))
= (1/2)(Pr[QF*  Dec_ERR  KU_ERR])
 (1/2)(Pr[QF*] + Pr[Dec_ERR] + Pr[KU_ERR])
Rewriting the above inequality, we get
Pr[QF*]  2  Pr[Dec_ERR]  Pr[KU_ERR]
N  1 qDec
 2 
 k .
qKU
2
xyz

If the event QF* happens, we claim that * = e(P, P) e(dP, (h*, i*)(zP)) will be left in
some entry of F_list. Consequently, B has non-negligible probability
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'  (qF  )(2 
1

N  1 qDec
 k )
qKU
2

1

to solve the BDHP by computing e(dP, (h*, i*)(zP)) *. The computational time required
for B is t'  t + t(2qEnc + qDec).
Q.E.D.

5. Conclusions
Key-insulated cryptosystems aim at reducing the damage caused by the key exposure. In this
paper, we combine identity-based and key-insulated systems to propose the first novel
IB-KIE scheme with message linkages for facilitating the encryption of a large plaintext in
peer-to-peer communication networks. In addition to the inherent property of key-insulated
systems that each client can periodically update his private key while the public one remains
unchanged, the proposed scheme also supports unbounded time periods and random-access
key-updates. By integrating with identity-based systems, it is unnecessary to maintain public
key certificates. The underlining computational assumption of our scheme is based on the
well-known bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) which is believed to be no harder than
the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem and is intractable in polynomial time.
Furthermore, the security requirement of confidentiality against indistinguishability under
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is realized in the random oracle model. Our
proposed scheme is also suitable for the encryption and transmission of DNA/RNA
biological sequences and the data structure such as linked list. In the future research, we will
attempt to develop an enhanced variant with error correction capability. That is, the receiving
client can identify the erroneous ciphertext blocks during the transmission and request to
resend only these blocks again, rather than all ones, which helps gain more bandwidth
saving.
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